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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20000497-CA 
vs. 
JASON EDWARD PAYNE, Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for attempted unlawful possession or use 
of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000), in the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Sentencing in absentia. Did the sentencing court err when it sentenced defendant 
in absentia, where defendant had notice of the hearing and was free to attend, but did 
not? 
2. Findings of fact. Did the trial court rely on an inaccurate finding of fact when 
it determined the sentence? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3. Information in mitigation. Did the sentencing court deny defense counsel 
the opportunity to present information in mitigation and, if so, did the denial constitute 
plain error? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991). Where a sentencing decision 
involves a question of law, appellate review is under the "correctness of error" 
standard. Id. Review of factual findings is for clear error. See id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2). 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally 
present at the trial with the following exceptions: 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the 
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of 
the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a 
verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if 
defendant had been present;.. . 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)&(b). 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no , 
contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be 
not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless 
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. 
Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue 
or alter bail or recognizance. < 
2 
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Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of 
sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in 
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in 
defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a 
warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-
37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 2000). R. 2. On February 2, 2000, defendant pleaded guilty to 
attempted unlawful possession, a class A misdemeanor. R. 10. The court accepted 
his guilty plea, informed him that sentencing was set for March 31, and ordered him 
to report to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for preparation of a presentence 
report. R. 18-20. 
Defendant appeared on March 31, but the presentence report had not been 
prepared. Defendant stated that he had not completed his interviews with AP&P 
first because he didn't have his case number and then because he needed to get 
proof of his employment and his high school diploma. He indicated that he now 
had his paperwork, that he had reported to AP&P two weeks prior to his sentencing 
date, and that AP&P needed more time. The sentencing court granted defendant a 
continuance until May 5, ordered him to appear at AP&P as soon as he left the 
3 
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courtroom, and warned his that he was in a "very precarious situation" due to his 
delays. R. 48:5. 
On May 3 AP&P filed a letter with the court stating that a report could not be 
completed in time for the sentencing hearing on May 5. Defendant had made an 
appointment for April 6, but when AP&P called to confirm, a family member 
indicated that defendant had not filled out his packet. AP&P rescheduled for April 
13, but defendant did not appear. AP&P advised the court that it could not 
complete the presentence report due to defendant's failure to appear, and the court 
issued a non-bailable warrant for his arrest. R. 28. 
On May 5 defendant's counsel appeared, but indicated that she had had no 
contact with defendant. The court noted that defendant had been told both orally 
and in writing to appear on that date for sentencing and had been ordered to contact 
AP&P for preparation of the presentence report. That fact, together with his failure 
to contact either counsel or the court, led the court to conclude that he had 
voluntarily "not chosen to comply with the terms of this Court's order." R. 49:3. 
The court then asked defendant's counsel whether, "[o]ther than his failure to 
appear . . . do you have a legal reason as to why the defendant should not be 
sentenced today?" Id. Counsel responded, "No, your Honor, except that I think it i 
would violate his due process rights and his right according to Rule 22 of the 
Criminal Rules of Procedure, Judge, that he has a right to . . . ." Id. Responding, 
4 
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the court stated that it would move forward with the case and then sentenced 
defendant to a one-year term in the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Center. Id. 
On May 11, the court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The 
entry includes the following findings: 
1. "On February 10, 2000, defendant entered a guilty plea . . . [and] was 
referred to AP&P for a pre-sentence report." R. 33. 
2. "On March 31, 2000, defendant, who was out of custody, appeared 
personally before this court with his counsel . . . . No pre-sentence 
report had been prepared so defendant was referred back to AP&P and 
personally given a new sentencing date of May 5, 2000." Id. 
3. "On May 5th defendant once again failed fo obtain a pre-sentence report 
and voluntarily failed to appear before this Court for sentencing." R. 
33-34. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the probable cause statement, defendant was riding one bike and 
carrying another on January 20, 2000, when an officer stopped him to determine 
whether both bikes were his. R. 3. Defendant was arrested when a computer 
check revealed that he had outstanding warrants. Id. In a search incident to his 
arrest, the officer found a plastic bag with a substance that field-tested positive for 
methamphetamine. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Sentencing in absentia, a. Defendant claims that the trial court erred 
when it sentenced him in absentia. However, "a defendant not accused of a capital 
5 
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crime waives his right to be present at sentencing by voluntary absence." State v. 
Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 1996). The trial court found that the 
defendant, who was free on release, was given both oral and written notice of the 
sentencing hearing. Thus, the court committed no error. 
b. Defendant claims, nevertheless, that his absence could not be truly 
voluntary where the court had not expressly told him that he could be sentenced in 
absentia. No Utah precedent imposes this requirement, and the weight of other 
precedent suggests that notice of the sentencing hearing is itself sufficient to meet 
any statutory or Constitutional requirements. 
2. Alleged reliance on inaccurate factual finding. Defendant claims that 
the court relied on an erroneous finding that he had been absent from all 
proceedings following his guilty plea. While the judge stated that defendant had 
failed to show for any hearings following the plea, the record demonstrates that the 
judge merely misstated himself and that he did not base his sentence on the 
misstaken notion that defendant was absent from both the initial and the final 
sentencing hearings. 
3. Presentation of facts in mitigation, a. The court did not deny defense 
counsel the opportunity to present information in mitigation. The record • .' < 
demonstrates that the court gave counsel an opportunity to speak and that counsel 
did not offer or attempt to offer such information. 
1 
6 
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b. Furthermore, even if error occurred, it was neither obvious nor harmful. 
No appellate precedent outlines the procedures to be followed when a defendant is 
absent or requires that a court make an explicit invitation to defense counsel to 
present information in mitigation. Defendant does not indicate any new information 
that he might have presented, and an absent defendant is an unlikely candidate for 
probation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS VOLUNTARILY ABSENT, THE COURT 
DID NOT ERR WHEN IT SENTENCED HIM IN ABSENTIA 
A. Defendant who was free on release, waived his right to be present at 
sentencing when he failed to appear. 
Defendant claims that the trial court violated due process and Rule 22 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure by sentencing him in absentia. He argues that 
"the record does not establish that [he] knowingly and voluntarily waived his right 
to be present and defend at sentencing." Br. Aplt. at 13. Defendant's argument is a 
challenge to the court's finding of fact on this point, and appellate review is for 
clear error. 
U[A] defendant not accused of a capital crime waives his right to be present at 
sentencing by voluntary absence." State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Utah 
1996). "On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in defendant's absence, 
7 
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defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah R. Crim. P. 
22(b). In non-capital cases, "the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after 
notice to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried 
and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if defendant 
had been present; . . ." Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2). 
Under rules 17 and 22, an absence is voluntary if the defendant has notice of 
the proceedings and is at liberty to attend in the sense that he is not incarcerated 
elsewhere. See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110, 1111. 
Here, the trial court found that defendant "voluntarily failed to appear 
for . . . sentencing." R. 34. This finding of fact was not clearly erroneous. 
Defendant received both oral and written notice of the hearing. R. 27, 48:5. 
Though not incarcerated, he failed to attend his interview with AP&P, resulting in a 
non-bailable warrant for his arrest. R. 29. Nothing in the record suggests that he 
was in custody. On the contrary, AP&P informed the court that defendant was not 
in custody, at least as of April 25, 2000. R. 28. No evidence contradicts the court's 
finding that defendant voluntarily chose to absent himself from the sentencing 
hearing. 
B. The court was not required to make an express warning that
 ( 
defendant would be sentenced in absentia. 
Defendant argues that, even conceding that he had notice, was not 
incarcerated, and chose not to attend, his absence cannot be considered voluntary < 
8 
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because the court did not tell him that it would proceed to sentencing in his absence. 
Br. Aplt. at 16. This claim raises a question of law, and review is for correctness. 
Defendant's contention finds little or no precedential support. Defendant cites 
no Utah precedent for this position, and the State has discovered none. Defendant 
cites only one case, United States v. McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1969), in 
support of this argument.1 McPherson addressed the right to be present at trial 
codified by Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The court 
observed that McPherson was the only defense witness and that continuation of the 
trial in his absence was tantamount to a guilty plea. It therefore ruled that the 
defendant must be warned of or other otherwise know the consequences of his 
absence, i.e., that if he "voluntarily absented himself he would be deemed to have 
waived his constitutional right to testify and to confront the witnesses against him so 
that the trial could continue without him." Id. at 1130. 
The third member of the McPherson panel dissented, countering that "[t]he 
right that was involved was the right to be present. Thus it follows that if the 
defendant knew or should have known that he had a right to be present, his 
voluntary absence . . . was a waiver of that 'known right.'" Id. at 1131. 
lThe Utah Supreme Court has cited McPherson, 421 F.2d at 1130, but only for the 
proposition that "[t]o intentionally relinquish the right to be present, the defendant must 
have notice of the proceedings." See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. 
9 
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McPherson was effectively overruled four years after its issuance. In Taylor 
v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973), a unanimous Supreme Court rejected a 
defendant's argument that mere voluntary absence cannot constitute an effective 
waiver of the right to be present at trial. Taylor argued that the record must also 
show that the defendant "knew or had been expressly warned by the trial court not 
only that he had a right to be present but also that the trial would continue in his 
absence." Id. at 19. The Court reasoned, "It is wholly incredible to suggest that 
petitioner, who was at liberty on bail, had attended the opening session of his trial, 
and had a duty to be present at trial. . . entertained any doubts about his right to be 
present at every stage of his trial. It seems equally incredible to us . . . that a 
defendant who flees from a courtroom in the midst of a trial. . . would not know 
that as a consequence the trial would continue in his absence." Id. at 20 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). By its ruling in Taylor, the Supreme Court 
affirmed a decision by a court of appeals that had expressly rejected McPherson. 
See United States v. Taylor, 478 F.2d 689 (1st Cir. 1973). 
While the issue in the instant case arises in the context of sentencing rather 
than guilt determination, the Supreme Court's reasoning is equally applicable here. 
Defendant's voluntary absence waived the right at issue, i.e., "the right to be 
present." Id. Defendant's suggestion that he did not clearly understand both that he 
10 
i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
had a right to be present at sentencing and that sentencing could continue in his 
absence strains credibility. 
Even in the specific context of a defendant's failure to appear at sentencing 
after either a guilty plea or guilty verdict, a majority of courts have held that the 
failure to appear constitutes voluntary absence and a waiver of a defendant's right to 
be present. See Christopher Hall, Annotation, Voluntary Absence of Accused When 
Sentence Is Pronounced, 59 A.L.R. 5th 135 (1998). While a few courts have 
required an express warning that sentencing will proceed in a defendant's absence, 
the majority have not. See, e.g., United States ex rei Rosemond v. Smith, 1994 WL 
119108, at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that defendant may be sentenced in absentia 
whether or not the court has specifically advised him of his right to be present as 
sentencing); Wingate v. Scully, 764 F. Supp. 319, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (determining 
that defendant who had deliberately failed to appear had waived his right to be 
present even though court did not expressly state that he had a right to be present at 
sentencing); see also Hall, supra. 
The trial court's determination that defendant was voluntarily absent is 
consistent with the weight of precedent in other jurisdictions. Notice that a 
sentencing hearing will be held on a certain date is sufficient to inform a defendant 
that he has a right to be present and that the hearing will be held-whether or not he 
11 
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chooses to attend. No specific warnings are required. The trial court correctly 
determined that it could proceed to sentencing in defendant's absence. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT RELY ON AN INACCURATE FINDING OF 
FACT WHEN IT DETERMINED THE SENTENCE 
Defendant argues that the sentencing judge based his sentence on the 
erroneous finding that defendant failed to appear at any court proceedings following 
his guilty plea. See Br. Aplt. at 10. Defendant bases this argument on the judge's 
statement at the May 5 sentencing hearing that defendant had pleaded guilty on 
March 31, 2000, and "thereafter failed to show at any of the Court ordered hearings 
and proceedings." R. 49:3. 
The record demonstrates that the judge merely misstated himself. The plea 
was entered in February. The case was then transferred to the sentencing judge, who 
met with defendant at the initially scheduled sentencing hearing on March 31. R., 
10, 25, 48:2. At that hearing, he granted defendant a continuance to allow him 
additional time to meet with AP&P for preparation of the presentence report and 
advised him that his delays had placed him in a "precarious situation." R. 48:5. The 
transcript of the May 5 sentencing hearing indicates that the judge rehearsed the 
details of defendant's appearance before him at the March 31 hearing moments 
before he stated that defendant had not shown at any hearing. The inaccuracy here 
is just a misstatement. Clearly, the judge had not forgotten defendant's appearance 
12 
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at the March 31 hearing. Furthermore, the court's findings of fact and conclusions 
of law expressly state that defendant appeared for sentencing on March 31. R. 33. 
The record demonstrates that the judge did not base his sentencing determination on 
the mistaken notion that defendant had been absent from all proceedings following 
his guilty plea. See State v. Potter, 863 P.2d 40, 42 (Utah App. 1993) (concluding 
that misstatement did not represent court's reasoning). 
Moreover, defendant did not appear at AP&P as ordered. He did not schedule 
an interview in time to prepare the presentence report required for the initial 
sentencing hearing. He did schedule an appointment with AP&P between the two 
hearings; but when AP&P called to confirm the appointment, his family indicated 
that he had not prepared his packet. AP&P then rescheduled the appointment, but 
defendant did not appear. 
Defendant's brief, relying on the minimal contacts associated with defendant's 
failures to appear, states that defendant "was in contact with AP&P and scheduled 
an appointment" after the plea hearing and "apparently contacted AP&P after the 
March 31 hearing and scheduled an appointment." Br. Aplt. at 10. Defendant 
suggests that the contact and the "apparent[]" contact are evidence that he attended 
court ordered hearings or proceedings. A/, at 10-11. 
These limited contacts, to the extent they occurred, in no way suggest that 
defendant "showed up" at a court ordered hearing or proceeding. The contacts were 
13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not the interviews necessary to complete the presentence report and, in any event, 
were not court ordered hearings or proceedings. The judge's factual findings are in 
no way undermined by their failure to reference these contacts. 
POINTIII 
THE SENTENCING COURT DID NOT PREVENT COUNSEL FROM 
PRESENTING INFORMATION IN MITIGATION 
Defendant relies on rule 22(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See Br. 
Aplt. at 6. That rule provides, "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the 
defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be 
imposed." Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a). "The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of sentence." Id. 
Defendant claims that the court "did not afford defense counsel the opportunity to 
make a statement regarding the appropriate sentence" and did not "allow defense 
counsel the opportunity to present any information in mitigation of sentence." Br. 
Aplt. at 9. 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate error. The trial court has substantial 
discretion in conducting sentencing hearings and imposing a sentence. See State v. 
San-wick, 713 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1986); State v. Howell 707 P.2d 115, 117 (Utah 
1985). As the transcript of this abbreviated sentencing proceeding demonstrates, the 
14 
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court never refused to hear counsel. Neither attorney requested the opportunity to be 
heard (R. 49:2-4). 
Defendant alleges that the sentencing judge foreclosed such requests when he 
cut short defense counsel's discussion of defendant's right to be present. The 
pertinent sections of the transcript read as follows: 
THE COURT: The fact that the defendant entered a plea of guilty 
on the 31st of March and was told both orally and in writing to be here 
on today's date for sentencing, and to contact AP&P for the obtaining of 
a presentence report, with no further word from him in the interim, leads 
me to conclude that he has not chosen to comply with the terms of this 
Court's order . . . . I will therefore proceed with the sentencing. 
Other than his failure to appear, Ms. Garland, do you have a legal 
reason as to why defendant should not be sentenced today? 
MS. GARLAND: No, your Honor, except that I think it would 
violate his due process rights and his right according to Rule 22 of the 
Criminal Rules of Procedure, Judge, that he has a right to -
THE COURT: Yes, and I can appreciate your view about that, but 
I will determine at this point that's not going to delay the moving 
forward of this case. 
There being no reason, therefore, why the defendant should not be 
sentenced . . . . I will order that he serve the time provided by law . . . . 
R. 49:2-3. While the sentencing judge did interrupt counsel's argument regarding 
defendant's right to be present, counsel did not attempt to present the "relevant and 
reliable" evidence that defendant claims on appeal. See Br. Aplt. at 7. The court's 
question, u[D]o you have a legal reason as to why defendant should not be sentenced 
today," afforded defense counsel the "opportunity to make a statement and to present 
15 
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any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why 
sentence should not be imposed." Fed. R. Crim. P. 22(a). By answering "No, 
except that I think it would violated his due process rights . . . .," counsel implied 
that she had nothing to address except the right to be present. Furthermore, nothing 
in the record establishes or suggests that the court would have denied counsel the 
opportunity had she later requested it. 
Even assuming arguendo that the court should have expressly offered counsel 
the opportunity to present mitigating information, the failure to do so did not 
constitute plain error. To establish plain error, as defendant must since the claim is 
unpreserved, he must show that (i) an error occurred, (ii) the error was obvious, and 
(iii) the error was harmful. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). 
Error, if any, was not obvious. "Utah courts have repeatedly held that a trial 
court's error is not plain where there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court." See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997). No appellate case 
law outlines the procedures to be followed when a defendant is absent or requires 
that a court make an express invitation to defense counsel to present information in 
mitigation. If any error occurred, it was therefore not obvious. 
Defendant points to precedent requiring sentencing judges to base their 
exercise of discretion in fixing a sentence on reliable and relevant information. See 
Br. Aplt. at 7. Specifically, he points to cases requiring that a criminal defendant be 
16 
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given a copy of the presentence report and opportunity to challenge any inaccuracies 
in the report. See id. In the instant case, defendant's own failure to appear at AP&P 
prevented the preparation of a presentence report. There was nothing to review and 
nothing to challenge. Defendant also points to precedent that precludes the reliance 
on unreliable hearsay in assessing a sentence. See id. at 8. However, defendant fails 
to identify even one example of hearsay, reliable or not, upon which sentencing was 
based. No obvious error occurred. 
Furthermore, even if error occurred and even if such error were obvious, it 
was nonetheless harmless. The mitigating factors that might have been offered, as 
detailed by appellant's brief, were defendant's work at two jobs, his interaction with 
pretrial services, and his attendance at substance abuse classes. See Br. Aplt. at 12. 
Defendant suggests that this information made him a candidate for probation and 
treatment rather than for imprisonment. See id. 
Any error is harmless, first, because the sentencing judge had already been 
informed of these possibly mitigating factors. This information was presented to the 
sentencing judge at the initially scheduled sentencing hearing. See R. 48:3. 
Defendant, in fact, cites to that hearing in detailing the factors in his brief. See Br. 
Aplt at 12. 
Any error is harmless, second, because the likelihood of probation in this case 
was close to nil. Even had the sentencing judge been reminded of the factors 
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rehearsed at the initial sentencing hearing, defendant's record of irresponsibility and 
unreliability and his failure to appear at the continued sentencing hearing altered the 
sentencing calculus. Defendant had failed to arrange for timely interviews with 
AP&P prior to the first sentencing hearing and therefore came to the hearing with no 
presentence report. When he was given another opportunity to meet with AP&P, he 
failed to appear. When notified of this failure, the sentencing judge ordered the 
issuance of a non-bailable warrant for his arrest. Finally, when defendant failed to 
appear for the rescheduled sentencing hearing, the judge sentenced him in absentia. 
Whatever mitigating information might have been presented, defendant could not 
have been considered a good candidate for probation and the requirements of 
probation. Rather, had it been necessary, the court would have been "entitled to 
aggravate appellant's sentence on the basis of his failure to appear." State v. 
Hoover, 728 P.2d 689, 691 (Ariz. App. 1986). "Actions such as appellant's 
absconding from the jurisdiction demonstrate a poor attitude and have been 
specifically held to provide appropriate bases for sentence aggravation." Id. 
Error, if there was any, was harmless. Any mitigating information had already 
been presented and, in any event, an absent defendant is an unlikely candidate for 
probation. 
18 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT OR PUBLISHED OPINION IS REQUESTED 
This appeal presents no issues of sufficient complexity or novelty to merit 
setting the matter for oral argument or issuing a published opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on October )J_, 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JEANNE B. INOUYE 
/Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to Joan C. Watt and Andrea J. Garland, 
Attorneys for Appellant, Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 
300, Salt Lake City, UT 84111, this H day of October, 2000. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JASON EDWARD PAYNE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
CaseNo.001902000FS 
Judge Frederick 
The above-entitled case came before this Court for sentencing on May 5,2000. The State 
of Utah was represented by its counsel, David E. Yocom and Matthew G. Nielsen, and the 
defendant, who was not present, was represented by Andrea Garland 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
On February 10,2000, defendant entered a guilty plea in the above entitled-matter to 
Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, before Judge Roger A. 
Livingston. Defendant was referred to AP&P for a pre-sentence report. On March 31,2000, 
defendant, who was out of custody, appeared personally before this Court for sentencing with his 
counsel, Andrea Garland. No pre-sentence report had been prepared so defendant was referred 
back to AP&P and personally given a new sentencing date of May 5, 2000. On May 5th 
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defendant once again failed to obtain a pre-sentence report and voluntarily failed to appear 
before this Court for sentencing 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Rule 22 specifically states, "On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in 
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's absence." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 22(b). Because defendant and his counsel were both given personal notice of the May 
5th sentencing and defendant failed to appear for his pre-sentence report and voluntarily failed to 
appear for his sentencing, defendant is hereby sentenced in his absence. Furthermore, defendant 
has waived any right to be present by his voluntary absence after being given personal notice. 
ORDER 
Based on defendant's voluntary absence, defendant is hereby sentenced in abstentia for 
the offense of Attempted Possession of a Controlled Substance, a Class A misdemeanor, to the 
following: One year in the Salt Lake County Adult Detention Complex, forthwith. 
DATED this j j ^ d a y of May 2000. 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on March 31f 2000) 
THE COURT: Call case No. CR002000. Ms. Garland, 
you're appearing on behalf of this defendant? 
MS. GARLAND: Yes, I am, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And you are Jason Edward Payne; is that 
correct? 
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Ms. Garland is your lawyer; is that 
correct? 
MR. PAYNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Esqueda, you're here on behalf of the 
State? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: For the record, the defendant entered a 
plea of guilty on a Class A misdemeanor charge of attempted 
possession of a controlled substance. These events occurred — 
that is, the plea part of it occurred — on the 10th of February 
of this year. 
A presentence report was ordered. There has been no 
report received, for the reason, apparently, that the defendant 
failed or refused to appear at the Office of Adult Probation 
and Parole. 
MR. GARLAND: Your Honor, he didn't receive — he did 
fail to go there. He has since gone there, your Honor, has 
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filled out his paperwork. The problem was, your Honor, that he 
was working two jobs. He didn't realize he needed to be up to 
AP&P as soon as he did need to. 
He's been doing very well with pretrial services. 
He's been keeping up with pretrial services, checking in. 
He's been attending LDS substance abuse classes. I've got 
some paperwork here confirming that, if you'd like to see it. 
So my request is that we continue the sentencing, and 
that he be allowed to go to AP&P. He's made an appointment 
with them for this coming week to have a presentence interview, 
and they told him that they would not be able to do that in 
time for sentencing. So my request is that we continue this 
and allow him to go back to AP&P and keep his appointment, and 
that we set this over. 
THE COURT: Why didn't you keep your appointment when 
you were told to report on the 10th — on or about the 10th of 
February? 
MR. PAYNE: Your Honor, I went to — I called them. 
They were going to start doing my presentence report over the 
phone, but I didn't have my case number and whatnot. So I 
went down there on my own, and I needed to get my proof of my 
employment, which I have, and my high school diploma, which I 
do have now. I've also got the paperwork that they gave me 
right here also. They told me that they need more time to do 
my presentence report. 
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THE COURT: So when did you go down there? 
MR. PAYNE: Two weeks ago, your Honor, and they said 
they needed more time. My pretrial worker told me to ask for 
a continuance so that they could finish the presentence report. 
THE COURT: I'm not in the business of accommodating 
late preparation of reports normally. 
MR. PAYNE: I've got it completed right here, sir, and 
also I've got six — 
THE COURT: Are you on pretrial service release now or 
bail? 
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir, pretrial release. 
THE COURT: What's the State's position, Mr. Esqueda? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Your Honor, I don't show any failure to 
appears on this case. 
THE COURT: Well, we haven't been notified of it. 
MR. ESQUEDA: No. 
THE COURT: Oh, you mean, on prior occasions? 
MR. ESQUEDA: On prior occasions. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ESQUEDA: If the Court is inclined to give him 
another opportunity, we would have no objection. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lane, do you have any contrary 
information from what's being told us here? 
MR. LANE: No, I do not, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Payne, is it starting to dawn upon you 
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the seriousness of the way I treat these matters? 
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: We will this time continue your sentencing 
to allow AP&P to prepare the report, but do not fail to attend 
to their meetings again; do you understand me? 
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: I haven't got the time to repeatedly see 
defendants who fail to keep appointments. We'll continue the 
matter to — 
COURT CLERK: May 5th. 
THE COURT: — May the 5th at 8:30. That's a Friday 
morning. Now, Mr. Payne, you've already been over there. I'm 
going to tell you now, and I don't want you to forget it. You 
go to that office as soon as you leave this courtroom. 
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: And you tell them the situation, the very 
precarious situation you're in, and you need to get that report 
completed. Is that clear to you? 
MR. PAYNE: Yes. 
THE COURT: Now, you're on release subject to certain 
terms and conditions, and you will continue to follow those 
terms and conditions, Mr. Payne. Do you understand me? 
MR. PAYNE: Yes, sir, I do. 
THE COURT: All right. Counsel, that'll be the order. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on May 5, 2000) 
MS. GARLAND: Good morning, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
MS. GARLAND: Andrea Garland on behalf of Jason Payne. 
He's No. 15 on your calendar. 
THE COURT: State of Utah versus Jason Edward Payne, 
case No. CR002000. Ms. Garland, you are appearing on behalf of 
the defendant, Mr. Payne. He's not with us, apparently. 
MS. GARLAND: I've not seen him, your Honor. I've not 
heard from him. 
THE COURT: Mr. Nielsen, are you here for the State? 
MR. NIELSEN: I am, your Honor. 
THE COURT: A warrant has been previously issued for 
Mr. Payne. However, given the circumstance that you've had no 
contact with him, this Court has had no contact with him, I am 
assuming that his failure to appear here today is a voluntary 
happenstance. 
MS. GARLAND: Since I haven't heard from him, we can't 
really draw that conclusion, Judge* 
THE COURT: Well, but we can in the interim, until I'm 
persuaded to the contrary. The fact that the defendant entered 
a plea of guilty on the 31st of March and was told both orally 
and in writing to be here on today's date for sentencing, and 
to contact AP&P for the obtaining of a presentence report, with 
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no further word from him in the interim, leads me to conclude 
that he has not chosen to comply with the terms of this Court's 
order and another Court's order. I will therefore proceed with 
the sentencing. 
Other than his failure to appear, Ms. Garland, do 
you have a legal reason as to why the defendant should not be 
sentenced today? 
MS. GARLAND: No, your Honor, except that I think it 
would violate his due process rights and his right according to 
Rule 22 of the Criminal Rules of Procedure, Judge, that he has 
a right to — 
THE COURT: Yes, and I can appreciate your view about 
that, but I will determine at this point that's not going to 
delay the moving forward of the case. 
There being no reason, therefore, why the defendant 
should not be sentenced, it appears to this Court, based upon 
the record, that on the 31st of March of this year he entered 
a plea of guilty to a Class A misdemeanor crime of attempted 
possession of a controlled substance. He has thereafter failed 
to show at any of the Court ordered hearings and proceedings. 
Accordingly I will order that he serve the term 
provided by law in the Adult Detention Center for a period of 
one year. I will order that he be committed forthwith to that 
institution. 
Mr. Nielsen, you prepare the appropriate findings of 
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fact, conclusions of law and order of voluntary absence. 
MR. NIELSEN: Okay. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Ms. Garland. 
MS. GARLAND: Thank you, your Honor. That's all that I 
have before you this morning. May I be excused? 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. Thank you. 
(Hearing concluded.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
-5-
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF UTAH ) 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That this proceeding was transcribed under my 
direction from the transmitter records made of these 
meetings. 
That this transcript is full, true, correct, and 
contains all of the evidence and all matters to which the 
same related which were audible through said recording, 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore, the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 12th day of June 
2000. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2004 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing in Utah County 
BEVERLY A. LOWE 
NOTWPUSUC'SMo/m 
1771 SOUTH CALIFORNIA AVE. 
PROVO, UT 84606 
COMM. EXP 2-24-2004 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
